In this paper, we propose an improved cryptanalysis of the double-branch hash function RIPEMD-160 standardized by ISO/IEC. We show how to theoretically calculate the step differential probability of RIPEMD-160, which was stated as an open problem by Mendel et al. at ASIACRYPT 2013. Secondly, based on the method proposed by Mendel et al. to automatically find a differential path of RIPEMD-160, we construct a 30-step differential path where the left branch is sparse and the right branch is controlled as sparse as possible. To ensure the message modification techniques can be applied to RIPEMD-160, some extra bit conditions should be pre-deduced and well controlled. These extra bit conditions are used to ensure that the modular difference can be correctly propagated. This way, we can find a collision of 30-step RIPEMD-160 with complexity 267. This is the first collision attack on round-reduced RIPEMD-160. Moreover, by a different choice of the message words to merge two branches and adding some conditions to the starting point, the semi-free-start collision attack on the first 36-step RIPEMD-160 from ASIACRYPT 2013 can be improved by a factor of 215.3 to 255.1.
Fukang Liu, Florian Mendel, Gaoli Wang: Collisions and Semi-Free-Start Collisions for Round-Reduced RIPEMD-160. ASIACRYPT 2017
This paper presents Gimli, a 384-bit permutation designed to achieve high security with high performance across a broad range of platforms, including 64-bit Intel/AMD server CPUs, 64-bit and 32-bit ARM smartphone CPUs, 32-bit ARM microcontrollers, 8-bit AVR microcontrollers, FPGAs, ASICs without side-channel protection, and ASICs with side-channel protection.
Like other permutations with sufficiently large state sizes, Gimli can easily be used to build high-security block ciphers, tweakable block ciphers, stream ciphers, message-authentication codes, authenticated ciphers, hash functions, etc.
Daniel J. Bernstein, Stefan Kölbl, Stefan Lucks, Pedro Maat Costa Massolino, Florian Mendel, Kashif Nawaz, Tobias Schneider, Peter Schwabe, François-Xavier Standaert, Yosuke Todo and Benoît Viguier: Gimli: a cross-platform permutation. CHES 2017
At CRYPTO’16, Beierle et al. presented SKINNY, a family of lightweight tweakable block ciphers intended to compete with SIMON. SKINNY can be implemented efficiently in both soft- and hardware, possesses a Substitution-Permutation-Network structure, and supports block sizes of 64 and 128 bits as well as key and tweak sizes of 64, 128, 192, and 256 bits. This paper outlines a related-tweakey impossible-differential attack on 21 rounds of SKINNY-64/128 and two attacks on 22 and 23 rounds of SKINNY-64/128 under the assumption that 48 bits of the tweakey are public.
Ralph Ankele, Subhadeep Banik, Avik Chakraborti, Eik List, Florian Mendel, Siang Meng Sim and Gaoli Wang: Related-Key Impossible-Differential Attack on Reduced-Round SKINNY. ACNS 2017
One prominent countermeasure against side-channel attacks, especially differential power analysis (DPA), is fresh re-keying. In such schemes, the so-called re-keying function takes the burden of protecting a cryptographic primitive against DPA. To ensure the security of the scheme against side-channel analysis, the used re-keying function has to withstand both simple power analysis (SPA) and differential power analysis (DPA). Recently, at SAC 2016, Keymill – a side-channel resilient key generator (or re-keying function) – has been proposed, which is claimed to be inherently secure against side-channel attacks. In this work, however, we present a DPA attack on Keymill, which is based on the dynamic power consumption of a digital circuit that is tied to the 0→1 and 1→0 switches of its logical gates. Hence, the power consumption of the shift-registers used in Keymill depends on the 0→1 and 1→0 switches of its internal state. This information is sufficient to obtain the internal differential pattern (up to a small number of bits, which have to be brute-forced) of the 4 shift-registers of Keymill after the nonce (or IV) has been absorbed. This leads to a practical key-recovery attack on Keymill.
Christoph Dobraunig, Maria Eichlseder, Thomas Korak, Florian Mendel: Side-Channel Analysis of Keymill. COSADE 2017
Side-channel attacks and in particular differential power analysis (DPA) attacks pose a serious threat to cryptographic implementations. One approach to counteract such attacks are cryptographic schemes based on fresh re-keying. In settings of pre-shared secret keys, such schemes render DPA attacks infeasible by deriving session keys and by ensuring that the attacker cannot collect side-channel leakage on the session key during cryptographic operations with different inputs. While these schemes can be applied to secure standard communication settings, current re-keying approaches are unable to provide protection in settings where the same input needs to be processed multiple times.
In this work, we therefore adapt the re-keying approach and present a symmetric authenticated encryption scheme that is secure against DPA attacks and that does not have such a usage restriction. This means that our scheme fully complies with the requirements given in the CAESAR call and hence, can be used like other nonce-based authenticated encryption schemes without loss of side-channel protection. Its resistance against side-channel analysis is highly relevant for several applications in practice, like bulk storage settings in general and the protection of FPGA bitfiles and firmware images in particular.
Christoph Dobraunig, Maria Eichlseder, Stefan Mangard, Florian Mendel, Thomas Unterluggauer: ISAP – Towards Side-Channel Secure Authenticated Encryption. FSE 2017
Recently, many efficient cryptographic hash function design strategies have been explored, not least because of the SHA-3 competition. These designs are, almost exclusively, geared towards high performance on long inputs. However, various applications exist where the performance on short (fixed length) inputs matters more. Such hash functions are the bottleneck in hash-based signature schemes like SPHINCS or XMSS, which is currently under standardization. Secure functions specifically designed for such applications are scarce. We attend to this gap by proposing two short-input hash functions (or rather simply compression functions). By utilizing AES instructions on modern CPUs, our proposals are the fastest on such platforms, reaching throughputs below one cycle per hashed byte even for short inputs, while still having a very low latency of less than 60 cycles.
Under the hood, this results comes with several innovations. First, we study whether the number of rounds for our hash functions can be reduced, if only second-preimage resistance (and not collision resistance) is required. The conclusion is: only a little. Second, since their inception, AES-like designs allow for supportive security arguments by means of counting and bounding the number of active S-boxes. However, this ignores powerful attack vectors using truncated differentials, including the powerful rebound attacks. We develop a general tool-based method to include arguments against attack vectors using truncated differentials.
Stefan Kölbl, Martin M. Lauridsen, Florian Mendel, Christian Rechberger: Haraka v2 – Efficient Short-Input Hashing for Post-Quantum Applications. FSE 2017
MANTIS is a lightweight tweakable block cipher recently published at CRYPTO 2016. In addition to the full 14-round version, MANTIS-7, the designers also propose an aggressive 10-round version, MANTIS-5. The security claim for MANTIS-5 is resistance against “practical attacks”, defined as related-tweak attacks with data complexity 2d less than 230 chosen plaintexts (or 240 known plaintexts), and computational complexity at most 2126−d.
We present a key-recovery attack against MANTIS-5 with 228 chosen plaintexts and a computational complexity of about 238 block cipher calls, which violates this claim. Our attack is based on a family of differential characteristics and exploits several properties of the lightweight round function and tweakey schedule. To verify the validity of the attack, we also provide a practical implementation which recovers the full key in about 1 core hour using 230 chosen plaintexts.
Christoph Dobraunig, Maria Eichlseder, Daniel Kales, Florian Mendel: Practical Key Recovery Attack on MANTIS-5. FSE 2017